offered a truce. The US, however, made the video available to the media because the speaker was so inept he did not know how to clear a stoppage on the stolen M249 automatic weapon he was "using."
According to the Washington Post, Zarqawi swore loyalty to bin Laden in October 2004 and was appointed OBL's deputy - a notion refuted by those closest to bin Laden. In an interview on Al-Majd TV, al Qaeda leader Walid Khan who was fighting alongside some jihadists who claimed to be associated with Zarqawi's Jund al Sham in Afghanistan said that the two groups did not get along and were not in fact allied. Bin Laden's Chief of Jihad, Saif al Adel, while engaged trying to overthrow Egypt's Mubarak on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood, however, tried to reconcile the hostile relationship between Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden because he agreed with Zarqawi's desire to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy. The Washington Post claimed that while Zarqawi may have accepted money from al-Qaeda, he "pursued an agenda that was largely distinct" from bin Laden.
Undermining this Washington Post theory, German wiretaps demonstrated that in the Fall of 2001, Zarqawi grew angry when his members were raising money in Germany for al Qaeda's local leadership, saying, "If something should come from their side, simply do not accept it." This recording was played at a trial of alleged Zarqawi operatives in Dusseldorf. It is also known that earlier this same year, Zarqawi expressly refused to swear allegiance to Osama bin Laden because he did not want to take sides against the Northern Alliance and he doubted the resolve of the Taliban.
While there is no connection of any kind between Zarqawi and Baghdadi, or between their organizations, it is true that Zarqawi briefly allied his Jama'at al-Tawhid wal Jihad mujahideen with al Qaeda, renaming them Tanzim Qaidat al Jihad Bilad al Rafidayn sometime in October 2004. However, when al Qaeda's Shadi Abdellah was arrested, he affirmed that Zarqawi and bin Laden were not actually linked as was being promoted and believed. Apart from one announcement made by someone who claimed to be associated with Zarqawi, the most that can be said is that Zarqawi may have accepted an endorsement to satiate his ego and validate his credentials, and may even have assisted Saif al Adel in shepherding jihadists into Syria and Iraq, but nothing more.
The lone exception to this conclusion is a October 2004 message posed on an Islamic website by someone claiming to represent Zarqawi's jihad interests, writing that Zarqawi had sworn his network's allegiance to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda for an endorsement by bin Laden. That message, which was neither written nor spoken by Zarqawi, himself, read:
"Numerous messages were passed between 'Abu Musab' (Allah protect him) and the al-Qaeda brotherhood over the past eight months, establishing a dialogue between them. No sooner had the calls been cut off than Allah chose to restore them, and our most generous brothers in al-Qaeda came to understand the strategy of the Tawhid wal-Jihad organization in Iraq, the land of the two rivers and of the Caliphs, and their hearts warmed to its methods and overall mission. Let it be known that al-Tawhid wal-Jihad pledges both its leaders and its soldiers to the mujahid commander, Sheikh 'Osama bin Laden' (in word and in deed) and to jihad for the sake of Allah until there is no more discord [among the ranks of Islam] and all of the religion turns toward Allah... By Allah, O sheikh of the mujahideen, if you bid us plunge into the ocean, we would follow you. If you ordered it so, we would obey. If you forbade us something, we would abide by your wishes. For what a fine commander you are to the armies of Islam, against the inveterate infidels and apostates!"
Keep in mind that the opening line proves that there was no meaningful dialog, relationship, nor franchise affiliation between Zarqawi and bin Laden from 2000 through 2004, and thus al Tawhid wal Jihad was not created as an affiliate of al Qaeda – nor did it act as such in 2002 or 2003 as Colin Powel told the United Nations. The purpose of this dialog was to establish that relationship on terms acceptable to both men. And after exchanging letters over the course of eight months, the agreed to disagree.
The reason behind the change of heart and brief alliance, should this have been approved by either man, was that al Qaeda was now irrelevant, bin Laden was in hiding, becoming little more than a legend, and Zarqawi craved the credibility an endorsement from the man once revered by Muslims for bloodying America would bring. Al Qaeda had never been a factor in Iraq. Al Qaeda's leaders had either been either killed or they were too far removed from the action to be of any value. The score of souls still affiliated with the organization were desperate for attention. And Zarqawi sought the standing in the Islamic world being lionized by the likes of Osama bin Laden would bring.
But the alliance between the two men if it occurred at all, was not tactical. One did not receive orders from the other. And this veil for appearance purposes crumbled in a fraction of the time it took to negotiate the news release. Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda's co-founder, wrote Zarqawi, bluntly warning him that Muslim public opinion was turning against him because he was fixated on murdering Shia Muslims rather than Infidels. The letter made it obvious that al Qaeda had no influence over Zarqawi or his al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, and that in fact, al Qaeda opposed both. These facts are irrefutable and they destroy the notion that al Tawhid wal Jihad ever actually became al Qaeda in Iraq.
As a result, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld conceded, “Zarqawi's alleged ties to al Qaeda are ambiguous. He may have been more of a rival than a lieutenant of bin Laden.” He even admitted, "Zarqawi may very well not have sworn allegiance to bin laden." And that "it could be legitimately said that he is not al Qaeda."
If that quote did not resolve this issue in your mind, you might as well stop reading.
Zarqawi was a typical Sunni Jihadist. He killed indiscriminately. He murdered far more Muslims than Infidels. Osama bin Laden was the exception to the rule. He targeted one foe at a time, transitioning from Russians to Americans. He opposed killing Muslims. But most of all, Zarqawi was a product of fake news, an American Bogeyman, the product of war propaganda and faulty intelligence. Unlike bin Laden before him or al Baghdadi after him, Zarqawi had no inspirational, planning, leadership, or tactical capabilities. He was an irrelevant and moronic thug.
Most all of the statements provided in the quoted material presented in the email were either false and their implications untrue, or they were irrelevant and misleading. It was another case of false news. We do ourselves and our God a disservice to share and promote that which is not true.
Zarqawi was a typical fundamentalist Muslim, and therefore an abhorrent man and murderer, who was further demonized to justify continued military operations in Iraq. A Sunni leader in Iraq would say: “Zarqawi is an American myth which was promoted to justify the occupation of Iraq.” The second most influential Iraqi, Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, said: “I believe he is fictitious. He is a knife or pistol in the hands of the occupier. I believe that all three – the occupation, the takfir (the practice of declaring other Muslims to be heretics who should be killed), and the Saddam supporters are a weapon in the hands of America and it pins its crimes on them.”
But the news regarding Zarqawi only gets worse. In April 2006, the Washington Post reported that the US military conducted a major propaganda offensive designed to exaggerate Zarqawi’s role in the Iraqi insurgency.” General Mark Kimmitt admitted, “the Zarqawi PSYOP Program is the most successful information campaign to date.”
It was all a deliberate hoax. The United States lied. A million people died and no one seems to know or care why.
While his death was reported eight times, beginning in 2002, 2003, twice in 2004, and four times in 2005 (May, September, November, and December), the official version promoted by the US military is that America bombed a home he was using in Baquba in June 2006, deploying two F16s and dropping two 500 pound guided bombs, a laser guided bomb, and a GPS guided bomb, killing him and five others. But these accounts are shrouded in controversy, some of which claim that US troops arrived on the scene and beat the man who they claimed to be Zarqawi to death.
And speaking of death, killing Zarqawi was counterproductive. The month following his alleged assassination was the deadliest in Iraqi history, with 1600 civilians succumbing to Islamic terrorism in a matter of weeks.
Now that we have destroyed the myth that Zarqawi ran an al Qaeda franchise in Iraq, let’s turn to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was born Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri in Samarra, Iraq in 1971. He was a shy, unimpressive religious scholar who eschewed violence according to those who knew him best. His youth was spent in a room attached to a small mosque in Tobchi, Iraq, a poor neighborhood in western Baghdad.
Ahmed al Dabash, the leader of the Islamic Army of Iraq, and contemporary of Ibrahim Badri, provided this depiction, one which matched those of Tobchi residents: “I was with Baghdadi at the Islamic University. We studied the same courses. He was quiet and retiring. He spent time alone. I came to befriend all of the jihadists fighting the occupation personally, including Zarqawi, …but I did not know Baghdadi. He was insignificant. He used to lead prayer in a mosque near my area. But no one really noticed him.”
Something that Ibrahim Badri, the future al Baghdadi, did drew America’s attention. He was arrested by US Forces-Iraq in February 2004 outside Fallujah and detained at the Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca detention centers under his birth name, Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badry. He was classified a “civilian internee.” In December, he was released as a “low level prisoner.” There is no report on what he may have done to illicit his arrest. But it was a mistake. In prison, the future al Baghdadi first met members of a Mujahideen Shura Council, the umbrella group which would become ISI and then ISIS.
If we are to believe the propaganda, Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri earned a doctorate for Islamic Studies in the Qur’an from Saddam University in Baghdad. That’s akin to being an expert in Dr. Seus’s Hop on Pop, albeit not as nurturing or pleasant. The Qur’an is irrefutably the worst book ever written. (If you disagree, read
www.ProphetOfDoom.net.)
While he was more cleric than jihadist, in 2005 after he was released from prison, he served on a local Sharia Committee for Jamaat Jaysh Ahl al Sunnah wa I Jamaah (JJASJ). It wasn’t until 2006 that he became a member of the Mujahideen Shura Council (majlis Shura al Mujahideen fi al Iraq) by serving on their Sharia Committee. He would eventually earn a seat on their Consultative Council. And it was this organization, MSCI, that was rebranded as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Baghdadi would not, however, become the leader of the ISI until May 2010 following the death of his predecessor, Abu Omar al Baghdadi.
The Mujahideen Shura Council of Iraq did not have, arm, train, or deploy jihadists. And while it was called “an umbrella organization,” it was actually an internet blogger, a source of fake news. Because it was cloaked in obscurity, if we are to believe the propaganda, the loose and unstructured confederacy was designed to make a handful of existing Sunni Islamic jihadist militias more effective. But in this regard, even as a marketing manager, promoter, and internet blogger, they failed. From 2006 through 2014, the Mujahideen Shura Council of Iraq accomplished nothing of any consequence.
But that is not to say that they were silent. They were internet bloggers after all.
According to their own reports, the MSCI inspired Sunni Salaf fundamentalists to oppose the American occupation and the Shiite government of Iraq. Their stated purpose was in their own words to: “Manage the struggle in the battle of confrontation to ward off the invading kafir (read Infidels) and their takfir stooges (read Shi’ites),…uniting the word of the mujahideen and closing their ranks, …determining a clear position toward developments and incidents so that people can see things clearly and the truth will not be confused with falsehood.”
But beyond this online release, and the online postings which followed, little if anything is known about the “organization,” its structure, or the jihadist groups with which it allegedly associated. It is a dark and blank slate that beacons to be written upon by those promoting an agenda. And few were more adapt at garnering attention than the propaganda czar of the Mujahideen Shura Council of Iraq, Murasel, who posted updates conveying accolades of the Council’s accomplishments – few if any were meaningful or credible. Like so many in the Islamic world, they accepted credit for the work of others – no matter how evil.
In October 2006 the MSCI announced their “Mutayibeen Coalition” on the internet, consisting of the MSCI (which did not have jihadists), three extremely small and essentially unknown jihadist groups, and for the first time, Sunni tribes. And because they counted the entire population of those tribes, the MSCI claimed to be 300,000 members strong. The internet video showed six white-clad masked men, “representing the Shura Council of the Jihad Fighters in Iraq, the Jaysh al Fatihin (the Army of the Conquerors), Jund al Sahaba (the Army of the Companions), Kataib Ansar al Tawhid wal Sunna (the Monotheism and Sunnah Brigades), and many of the sheikhs of the faithful tribes in Iraq, taking an oath of the scented ones (hilf al mutayyabin).”
They announced: “To implement Allah’s Sharia we swear by Allah to do our utmost to free the prisoners of their shackles, and to rid Sunnis from the oppression of the Shi’ite Muslims and the crusader occupiers, to assist the oppressed and restore rights even at the price of our own lives, to make Allah’s word supreme in the world and to restore the glory of Islam.”
You’ll note, there was no mention of bin Laden, al Qaeda, or al Qaeda in Iraq. There was no mention of Zarqawi or his Jama'at al-Tawhid wal Jihad, either. The Shura Council of the Jihad Fighters in Iraq was not based upon nor an outgrowth of either. And for the first time, the Sunni sheikhs and tribes who comprised the Awakening Program were listed as part of a jihadi organization. This was a tribal alliance.
The Shura Council of the Jihad Fighters in Iraq was a Sunni, Iraqi, Islamic organization, not an al Qaeda franchise. Its objectives were known, as was its god, Allah, its constitution, the Qur’an, and its purpose, jihad.
Several days thereafter, the Shura Council of the Jihad Fighters in Iraq announced on the internet that it would be henceforth known as “the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and would encompass the governorates of Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salaheddin, Niniveh, and parts of Babel and Wasit.” This was in essence central and western Iraq where most Sunni Iraqi’s lived.
ISI was branding itself like a nation based upon ethnicity, religion, and geography rather than on jihad. This made it fundamentally different than anything that the world had witnessed since the rebirth of Islamic terrorism with the PLO. As such, Abu Omar al Baghdadi announced that he was the new state’s Emir. The